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The Semantic Web: 
Apotheosis  
of Annotation,  
but What Are  
Its Semantics?
Yorick Wilks, University of Sheffield
This article discusses 
what kind of entity the 
proposed Semantic 
Web is, principally 
by reference to the 
relationship of 
natural language 
structure to knowledge 
representation.
In the middle of a cloudy thing is another cloudy thing, and within that another cloudy thing, inside which is yet 
another cloudy thing … and in that is yet another cloudy thing, inside which is something perfectly clear and 
definite.”—ancient Sufi saying
This article considers what kind of object the Semantic Web (SW) is to be. In partic-ular, it asks about SW semantics in the context of the relationship between knowl-
edge representations (KRs) and natural language. This is a vast, and possibly ill-formed, 
issue, but the SW is no longer simply an aspiration in a magazine article;1 it’s a serious 
research subject worldwide, with its own confer-
ences and journal. So, although the SW might not 
yet exist in a demonstrable form, in the way the 
Web itself plainly does, it’s a topic about which we 
can ask fundamental questions as to its representa-
tions, their meanings, and their groundings, if any.
The concept of the SW has two distinct origins, 
and this bifurcation persists in two differing lines of 
SW research: one closely allied to notions of docu-
ments and natural language processing (NLP) and 
one not. These differences of emphasis or content 
carry with them different commitments about what 
it is to interpret a KR and what the interpretation 
method has to do with meaning in natural language.
I’ll try to explore both these strands here, but my 
assumptions will be consistent with the first branch 
of the bifurcation. That is, I assume that natu-
ral language is, in some clear sense, humans’ pri-
mary method of conveying meaning and that other 
methods of conveying meaning (formalisms, sci-
ence, mathematics, codes, and so on) are parasitic 
upon it. This view isn’t novel: it was once associ-
ated firmly with the philosophy of Ludwig Witt-
genstein,2 who I believe is slightly more relevant to 
these issues than Graeme Hirst argued with his im-
mortal, satirical, line,
The solution to any problem in AI may be found in 
the writings of Wittgenstein, though the details of the 
implementation are sometimes rather sketchy.3
The quotation at the beginning of this article is 
intended to suggest not a skeptical position but one 
where the SW will become a reality. Many popu-
lar criticisms of the SW (for example, see http:// 
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halfanhour.blogspot.com/2007/03/why- 
semantic-web-will-fail.html) don’t examine 
foundational issues with any care. More-
over, they fail to see that their thrust—for 
example, that agreed ontologies in a field are 
difficult to obtain—implies that science and 
medicine can’t be formalized at all, quite 
independently of the SW’s existence. Such 
a view is completely at odds with current 
developments in e-science practice,4 and in-
deed the whole history of science itself.
The Semantic Web and AI
Hirst’s comment serves to show that any 
relation between philosophies of meaning, 
such as Wittgenstein’s, and classic AI (or 
Gofai—Good Old-Fashioned AI—as it’s of-
ten known) isn’t an easy one. Gofai remains 
committed to some form of logical represen-
tation for the expression of meanings and in-
ferences, even if it isn’t the standard forms 
of the predicate calculus. Most issues of AI 
Journal consist of papers in this genre.
Some have taken the initial presentation 
of the SW by Tim Berners-Lee, James Hend-
ler, and Ora Lassila1 to be a restatement of 
the Gofai agenda in new and fashionable 
WWW terms. Their article describes a sys-
tem of services, such as scheduling a doc-
tor appointment for an elderly relative, that 
would require planning, accessing the da-
tabases of both the doctor’s and relative’s 
diaries, and synchronizing those databases. 
Such planning behavior has been at the 
heart of Gofai, and there has been a direct 
transition (quite outside the discussion of 
the SW by some researchers) from decades 
of research on formal KR in AI to the mod-
ern discussion of ontologies. This is clear-
est in work on formal ontologies represent-
ing the content of science,5,6 where many of 
the same researchers have transferred dis-
cussion and research from one paradigm to 
the other.
All this has been done under what you 
could call the standard KR assumption in 
AI. This assumption goes back to the ear-
liest research on systematic KR by John 
McCarthy and Patrick Hayes,7 which we 
could consider as defining core Gofai. The 
assumption here is that the predicates in 
such representations merely look like Eng-
lish words but are in fact formal objects, 
loosely related to the corresponding Eng-
lish but without its ambiguity, vagueness, 
and ability to acquire new senses with use. 
This assumption has been apparent in both 
the original SW paper and some of what has 
flowed from it, and I shall return to it later.
But few of the complex theories of KR in 
Gofai (McCarthy and Hayes’ fluents,7 Mc-
Carthy’s later autoepistemic logic,8 Hayes’ 
“naïve physics,”9 and Daniel Bobrow and 
Terry Winograd’s Knowledge Representa-
tion Language,10 to name but a few promi-
nent examples) have appeared in SW con-
tributions. A continuity of goals between 
Gofai and the SW hasn’t meant continuity 
of research traditions; this is both a gain and 
a loss. We’ve gained simpler representation 
schemes that are probably computable. The 
loss is due to the lack of sophistication in 
current schemes of the DAML+OIL (www.
w3.org/TR/daml+oil-reference) family and 
whether they now have the representational 
power to handle the complexity of the com-
monsense or scientific world, a point I re-
turn to later.
There have been at least two other tradi-
tions of input to what we now call the SW, 
and I’ll discuss one in some detail: the way 
in which the SW concept has grown from 
the traditions of document annotation.
Annotation and  
the SW’s lower end
Looking at the classic SW diagram from 
the original Scientific American article (see 
Figure 1), the tendency is to focus on the 
upper levels: rules, logic framework, and 
proof. It’s these, and their traditional inter-
pretations, that have caused both the SW’s 
critics and admirers to say that it’s Gofai by 
another name. But looking at the lower lev-
els, you find namespaces and XML, which 
are the products of what we can broadly call 
NLP. These products stem from the annota-
tion of texts by a range of NLP technologies 
we can conveniently gather under the name 
information extraction (IE).11
The available information for science, 
business, and everyday life still exists over-
whelmingly as text; for example, 85 percent 
of business data is unstructured data (that is, 
text). This is also true of the Web, although 
the proportion of it that’s text is almost cer-
tainly decreasing. And how can the Web be 
absorbed into the SW except by extracting 
information from natural text and storing 
it in some other form—for example, facts 
stored in a database or text annotations stored 
as metadata either with or separate from the 
texts themselves? These forms are exactly 
those that large-scale IE provides.12 If, on the 
other hand, we take the view that the Web 
won’t become part of the SW, we face an 
implausible evolutionary situation of a new 
structure starting up with no reference to its 
vast, functioning, but more primitive prede-
cessor. Things just don’t happen like that.
XML, the annotation standard that has 
fragmented into a range of cognates for 
particular domains (for example, TimeML 
and VoiceML), is only the latest standard in 
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Figure 1. Levels of annotation and objects in the Semantic Web.1 If you look 
at only the upper levels, the SW appears to be just another instance of “Good 
Old-Fashioned AI.” However, the lower levels (namespaces, XML, and RDFS) are 
products in part of natural language processing.
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the history of annotation languages. These 
languages attach codings to individual text 
items to indicate information about them or 
what should be done with them in some pro-
cess, such as printing. Indeed, annotation 
languages originated partly as metadata 
for publishing documents (the Stanford roff 
languages, then Donald Knuth’s TeX, and 
later LaTeX), as well as semi-independently 
in the humanities community as a way to 
formalize scholarly annotation of text. The 
Text Encoding Initiative adopted SGML 
(Standard Generalized Markup Language), 
a development of Charles Goldfarb’s origi-
nal GML.13 SGML in turn became the or-
igin of HTML (as a proper subset), which 
then gave rise to XML as well as being the 
genesis of the NLP annotation movement 
that initially underpinned IE technology.
There were early divisions over exactly 
how and where to store text annotations 
for computational purposes. For example, 
in SGML, annotations were infixed in the 
text with additional characters (as in La-
TeX), which made the annotated text more 
difficult for humans to read. The Darpa re-
search community, on the other hand, pro-
duced a functioning IE technology that 
stored annotations (indexed by spans of 
characters in the text) separately as meta-
data. This tradition is preserved in the 
University of Sheffield’s GATE (General 
Architecture for Text Engineering) lan-
guage-processing platform,12 for example, 
and underpins many European SW proj-
ects.14,15 This was one of the two origins of 
the metadata concept, the other being the 
index terms that were the basis of the stan-
dard information-retrieval (IR) approach to 
document relevance.
IE technology has some 25 years of his-
tory, which began with the hand-coded ap-
proaches of Naomi Sager16 and Gerald De-
Jong.17 IE then moved to a fully automatic 
system with tools such as the Claws4 pro-
gram18 for part-of-speech tagging. This was 
the first program that systematically added 
to a text “what it meant” even at the low 
level of interpretation that such tags repre-
sent. IE now reliably locates names in text 
and their semantic types, and relates them 
together by means of learned structures 
called templates into forms of facts and 
events. Such structures are virtually iden-
tical to the RDF triple stores that form the 
basis of the SW, which aren’t quite logic but 
are similar to IE output. IE began by simply 
automating annotation but has progressed to 
the point where “annotation engines” based 
on machine learning15 can learn to annotate 
in any form and in any domain.
Extensions of IE technology have led 
to effective question-answering systems 
trained from text corpora in well-controlled 
competitions and, more recently, to the use 
of IE patterns to build ontologies directly 
from texts.19 Ontologies are basically con-
ceptual-knowledge structures, which orga-
nize facts derived from IE at a higher level. 
They’re close to the traditional KR goal of 
AI and occupy the middle level in the origi-
nal SW diagram. I’ll return to them later. My 
point here is just that the SW inevitably rests 
on some technology within the scope of IE, 
to annotate raw texts to derive company and 
person names first, then semantic typings of 
entities, then fact databases, and later on-
tologies. Where would lists of names, and 
namable objects, come from, if not automat-
ically from texts? Are we to imagine that re-
searchers make up such inventories?
This view of the SW underlies most Eu-
ropean work on the SW and Web services.20 
In this view, the SW at its base level is a 
conversion from the Web of texts through 
an annotation process of increasing grasp 
and vision. Such a process projects notions 
of meaning up the classic SW diagram from 
the bottom. Richard Braithwaite wrote a 
classic book on how scientific theories get 
the semantic interpretation of “high level” 
abstract entities (such as neutrinos or bo-
sons) from low-level data.21 He called this 
process semantic ascent up a hierarchi-
cally ordered scientific theory. This view of 
the SW, which sees NLP and IE among its 
foundational processes, bears a striking re-
semblance to that view of scientific theories 
in general.
Blurring the  
text-program distinction
These IE technologies add “the meaning of 
a text” to Web content in varying degrees 
and forms. They also constitute a blurring 
of the distinction between language and 
KR, because the annotations are themselves 
forms of language, sometimes close indeed 
to the language they annotate. This process 
at the same time blurs the distinction be-
tween programs and language itself. Histor-
ically, two contrary assertions have already 
blurred this distinction:
Texts are really programs (which is one 
form of Gofai).
Programs are really texts.
As to the first assertion, there’s Carl 
Hewitt’s claim that “language is essen-
tially a side effect” in AI programming and 
knowledge manipulation.22 H. Christopher 
Longuet-Higgins argued that English was 
essentially a high-level programming lan-
guage.23 Edsger Dijkstra’s view of natural 
language (personal communication) was es-
sentially that natural languages weren’t up 
to the job they had to do and would be bet-
ter replaced by precise programs, which is 
close to being a form of this assertion.
A smaller group—what you might term 
the “Wittgensteinian opposition”—main-
tains the second assertion. From this group’s 
perspective, natural language is and always 
must be the primary KR device. As I men-
tioned before, all other representations, no 
matter what their purported precision, are 
parasitic upon language; they couldn’t exist 
if language didn’t.24 The reverse isn’t true, 
of course, and hasn’t been for most of hu-
man history. Such representations can never 
be wholly divorced from language, in terms 
of their interpretation and use. This article 
is intended as a modest contribution to that 
tradition; a great deal more can be found in 
a dialogue with Sergei Nirenburg.25
According to this second perspective, 
systematic annotations are just the most re-
cent bridge from language to programs and 
logic. Not long ago, it was perfectly accept-
able to assume that a KR must be derivable 
from an unstructured form—that is, natural 
language. As William Woods stated,
A KR language must unambiguously repre-
sent any interpretation of a sentence (logi-
cal adequacy), have a method for translating 
from natural language to that representation, 
and must be usable for reasoning.26
•
•
The available information  
for science, business, 
and everyday life still exists 
overwhelmingly as text;  
for example, 85 percent  
of business data is text. 
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The emphasis here is on a method of going 
from the less to the more formal, a process 
that inevitably imposes a dependency be-
tween the two representational forms (lan-
guage and logic). This gap has opened and 
closed in different research periods. In the 
original McCarthy and Hayes writings on 
KR in AI,7 it’s clear, as with Hewitt and 
Dijkstra’s views, that they thought language 
was vague and dispensable. We can view 
the annotation movement associated with 
the SW as closing the gap in the way in that 
Woods described.
The separation of annotations into meta-
data has strengthened the view that the 
original language from which the annota-
tion was derived is dispensable. However, 
the infixing of annotations in a text suggests 
that the whole (original plus annotations) 
still forms some kind of object. The “dis-
pensability of the text” view doesn’t depend 
on the type of representation derived—in 
particular, logical or quasilogical represen-
tations. Roger Schank considered the text 
dispensable after his Conceptual Depen-
dency representations had been derived. 
This is because he believed that those repre-
sentations contained the text’s whole mean-
ing, implicit and explicit, even though they 
wouldn’t be considered any kind of formal 
KR.27 This is a key issue that divides opin-
ion here: Can we know that any represen-
tation whatsoever contains all and only the 
meaning content of a text, and what would it 
be like to know that?
Standard philosophical problems such 
as this one might or might not vanish as 
we push ahead with annotations to bridge 
the gap from text to meaning representa-
tions, whether or not we then throw away 
the original text. David Lewis would likely 
have castigated all such annotations as 
“markerese,” his name for any markup cod-
ing with objects still recognizably in natu-
ral language and thus not reaching to any 
meaning outside language.28
The SW movement, at least as I’ve de-
scribed it here, takes this criticism head on 
and continues onward, hoping that URIs 
and what some call the “popping out of 
the virtual world” (for example, by giving 
a Web representation your concrete phone 
number) will solve semantic problems. That 
is, this movement accepts that the SW, even 
if it’s based on language via annotations, 
will provide sufficient inferential traction 
with which to run Web services.
Is this plausible? Can all you want to 
know be put in RDF triples, and can they 
then support the subsequent reasoning re-
quired? Even when agents thus based seem 
to work in practice, nothing will satisfy a 
critic such as Lewis except a Web based on 
a firm (that is, formal and extrasymbolic) 
semantics and effectively unrelated to lan-
guage at all. But a century of experience 
with computational logic has shown that 
this can’t be had outside narrow and com-
plete domains. So, the SW might be the best 
way of showing that a nonformal semantics 
can work effectively, just as language itself 
does, and in some of the same ways.
An IR critique of SW semantics
In a critique of the SW, Karen Spärck Jones 
returned to a theme she had deployed before 
against much non-empirically based NLP 
such as ontology building: “words stand for 
themselves” and not for anything else.29 This 
claim has been the basis of successful IR re-
search in the Web and elsewhere. Content, 
for her, can’t be recoded in any general way, 
especially if it’s general content as opposed 
to that from a specific domain. In a specific 
domain, such as medicine, she seemed to 
believe technical ontologies might be possi-
ble as representations of content. As she put 
it mischievously, IR has gained from “de-
creasing ontological expressiveness.”
Her position is a restatement of the tra-
ditional problem of recoding content by 
means of other words (or symbols closely 
related to words, such as thesauri, seman-
tic categories, features, and primitives). 
This task is what automated annotation at-
tempts to do on an industrial scale. Spärck 
Jones’ key example is (in part) “A Charles 
II parcel-gilt cagework cup, circa 1670.” 
What, she asks, can be recoded there, into 
any other formalism, beyond the relatively 
trivial form {object type: CUP}?
What, she asks, of the rest of that (per-
fectly real and useful) description of an ar-
tifact in an auction catalog, can be rendered 
other than in the exact words of the catalog 
(and of course their associated positional in-
formation in the phrase)? This is a powerful 
argument, even though this example’s per-
suasiveness might rest more than she would 
admit on it being one of a special class of 
cases. The fact remains that content can in 
general be expressed in other words: this is 
what dictionaries, translations, and summa-
ries routinely do. Where she’s right is that 
Gofai researchers are wrong to ignore the 
continuity of their predicates and classifi-
ers with the language words they clearly re-
semble, and often differ from only by being 
written in uppercase.25 What can be done to 
ameliorate this impasse?
One method is to construct empirical 
ontologies from corpora,19,30 now a well- 
established technology, even if it can’t yet 
create complete ontologies. This is a version 
of the previous Woods quote, according to 
which a KR (an ontological one in this case) 
must be linked to some natural language 
text to be justifiably derived. We can then 
consider this derivation to give meaning to 
the conceptual classifier terms in the ontol-
ogy, in a way that just writing them down a 
priori doesn’t.
An analogy here would be with gram-
mars. When linguists wrote them down “out 
of their heads,” those grammars were never 
much use as input to programs to parse lan-
guage into structures. Now that grammar 
rules can be effectively derived from cor-
pora, parsers can produce better structures 
from sentences by using those rules.
A second method for dealing with the 
impasse is to return to the observation that 
we must take “words as they stand.”29 But 
perhaps, to adapt George Orwell, not all 
words are equal; perhaps some are aristo-
crats, not democrats. From this perspec-
tive, what were traditionally called seman-
tic primitives remain just words but are also 
special words: a set that form a special lan-
guage for translation or coding, albeit one 
whose members remain ambiguous, like all 
language words. If such privileged words 
exist, perhaps we can have explanations and 
innateness (even definitions) alongside an 
empiricism of use. John Olney showed that 
counts of the words used in definitions in an 
actual dictionary (Webster’s Third New In-
It might now be possible,  
using the whole Web— 
and thus reducing data 
sparsity—to produce 
much larger models  
of a language. 
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ternational Dictionary, in his case) reveal a 
clear set of primitives on which all the dic-
tionary’s definitions rest.31
By “empiricism of use,” I mean the ap-
proach that has been standard in NLP since 
the work of Frederick Jelinek and John Laf-
ferty32 and that has effectively driven Gofai-
style approaches based on logic to the pe-
riphery of NLP. Jelinek attempted to build 
a machine translation system at IBM based 
entirely on machine learning from bilingual 
corpora. He wasn’t ultimately successful, in 
the sense that his results never beat those 
from Systran, the leading handcrafted sys-
tem. However, he changed NLP’s direction; 
researchers consequently tried to recon-
struct, by empirical methods, the linguis-
tic objects on which NLP had traditionally 
rested: lexicons, grammars, and so on.
The barrier to further advances in NLP 
by these methods seems to be the data-
sparsity problem to which Jelinek origi-
nally drew attention. In short, the problem 
is that language is a system of rare events. A 
complete model for a language (say, at the 
trigram level, a trigram being a sequence 
of three words from a larger sequence of 
words) seems very difficult to derive. Much 
of any new, unseen, text corpus may always 
remain uncovered by such a model.
The Web as a corpus
However, it might now be possible, using 
the whole Web—and thus reducing data 
sparsity—to produce much larger mod-
els of a language. This could bring us far 
closer to the full language model necessary 
for tasks such as complete annotation and 
automatically generated ontologies. The 
Wittgensteinian will always want to look 
for the use rather than the meaning, and no-
where has more use become available than 
on the whole Web itself. Here, I briefly de-
scribe research that attempts to make data 
for a language much less sparse, without 
loss. These results are as yet only sugges-
tive and incomplete, but they do seem to 
offer a way forward.
Adam Kilgarriff and Gregory Grefen-
stette were among the first to point out that 
the Web itself can now become a language 
corpus in principle, even though that corpus 
is far larger than any human could read in a 
lifetime.33 A rough computation shows that 
a person would need about 60,000 years to 
read all the English documents now on the 
Web. But the issue here isn’t building a psy-
chological model of an individual, so this 
fact about size needn’t deter us. Roger Moore 
noted that, if a baby had to use current NLP 
speech-learning methods, learning to speak 
would require a hundred years of exposure 
to data.34 But this fact hasn’t deterred the 
development of effective speech technology. 
Grefenstette provided a simple and strik-
ing demonstration of the value of treating 
the whole Web as a corpus. His experiments 
showed that the most frequent translation of 
a word pair on the Web—from among all 
possible translation-equivalent word pairs—
is invariably the correct one.35
The Reveal project takes large corpora, 
such as a 1.5-billion-word corpus from the 
Web, and asks how much of a test corpus is 
covered by the trigrams in that large train-
ing corpus.36 The project considers both 
regular trigrams and skip-grams, which 
are trigrams consisting of any discontinuity 
of items with a maximum window of four 
skips between any of the trigram’s mem-
bers. Consider this sentence:
Chelsea celebrates Premiership success.
The two standard trigrams in that sequence 
are
Chelsea celebrates Premiership
celebrates Premiership success
But the one-skip trigrams will be
Chelsea celebrates success
Chelsea Premiership success
These skip-grams seem at least as informa-
tive, intuitively, as the original trigrams. Re-
veal experiments suggest that, surprisingly, 
skip-grams buy additional coverage with-
out the expense of producing nonsense. Re-
cent research shows that using skip-grams 
can be more effective than increasing the 
corpus size. For a 50-million-word corpus, 
skip-grams have achieved results similar 
to (in terms of coverage of test texts) those 
of quadrupling the corpus size. This illus-
trates the possible use of skip-grams to ex-
pand contextual information to get some-
thing closer to 100 percent coverage. Such 
an approach would combine greater cover-
age with little degradation, thus achieving 
something much closer to Jelinek’s original 
goal for an empirical corpus linguistics.
The 1.5-billion-word training corpus 
contained 67 percent of those trigrams ap-
pearing in randomly chosen 1,000-word 
test texts in English. That is, 67 percent of 
the trigrams found in any random 1,000-
word passage of English were found in the 
gigaword corpus. But my colleagues and I 
obtained 74 percent coverage with four-skip 
trigrams (see Figure 2). This suggests, by 
extrapolation, that to achieve 100 percent 
trigram coverage (including skip-grams of 
up to four skips), a corpus must contain 75 
× 1010 words. Our corpus giving 74 percent 
coverage was 15 × 108 words, and Grefen-
stette calculated there were more than 1011 
English words on the Web in 200335 (that 
is, about 12 times what Google indexed at 
that time). So, the corpus needed for com-
plete coverage of training texts by trigrams 
would be about seven times the full English 
Web in 2003, which is somewhat closer to 
the size of today’s (2007) English Web.
All this is, again, preliminary and tenta-
tive, but it suggests that an empiricism of 
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Figure 2. The percentage of trigrams seen with training-corpus size. The percentage 
grows linearly with the training-corpus size.
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usage might now be more accessible (with 
corpora closer to the whole Web) than 
Jelinek thought at the time (1990) of his ma-
jor machine translation work at IBM.
Because such modern Web corpora are 
so vast they can’t conceivably offer a model 
of how humans process semantics, a cogni-
tive semantics based on such usage remains 
an open question. However, one way for-
ward might be to adapt skip-grams so that 
they can pick up agent-action-object triples 
capturing protofacts in very large numbers 
(perhaps with the aid of a large-scale fast 
surface parser of the kind already applied 
to large chunks of the Web). This is an old 
dream going back at least to 1968, where 
I viewed similar triples as trivial Wittgen-
steinian “forms of fact.”37 These extracted 
(triple) text objects were later revived by 
Kilgarriff and Grefenstette as a “massive 
lexicon”33 and are now available as inven-
tories of surface facts at ISI.38 These objects 
don’t differ much from standard RDF tri-
ples and might offer a way to cheaply derive 
massive SW content, even more simply than 
by machine learning-based IE.
If anything along these lines is possible, 
then NLP will be able to provide the base 
semantics of the SW more effectively than 
it does now, by using a large portion of the 
Web as its corpus. If you find this notion 
unattractive, I challenge you to demonstrate 
some other plausible technique for deriv-
ing the massive RDF content the SW will 
require. Can anyone seriously believe this 
can be done other than by NLP techniques 
of the type I’ve been describing?
A third view of the SW:  
Trusted databases
This third view emphasizes databases as the 
SW’s core. In this view, a cadre of guard-
ians protects the databases’ integrity, keep-
ing the meanings of their features constant 
and trustworthy. This is a matter quite sepa-
rate from both logical representations (dear 
to Gofai) and any language-based method-
ology such as I’ve described in this article.
This view is, I believe, close to Berners- 
Lee’s own vision of the SW.1 His vision 
deserves extended discussion and consid-
eration that can’t be given here, but it will 
inevitably suffer from the difficulty of any 
view (such as Gofai) that seeks to preserve 
predicates, features, facets, or whatever 
from the NLP vagaries of changing sense 
and drift over time. We still “dial” numbers 
when we make a phone call, even though 
telephones no longer have dials; so not even 
number-associated concepts are safe from 
time. The long-running Cyc project,39 one 
of the predecessors of the SW as a universal 
repository of formalized knowledge, suf-
fered from precisely such “predicate drift”: 
predicates don’t mean this year what coders 
meant by them 20 years earlier. The SW at 
present offers no solution to this problem.
Berners-Lee’s vision has the virtues and 
defects of Hilary Putnam’s later theory 
of meaning, where scientists become the 
guardians of meaning.40 For example, only 
scientists know the true chemical nature of 
molybdenum and how it differs from alu-
minum, which has the same appearance. 
So, only these guardians know the meaning 
of molybdenum. Putnam’s theory required 
that scientists don’t allow the criteria of 
meaning to leak to the general public, lest 
the criteria become subject to change. Many 
observers have argued that you can’t make 
this separation, in principle or in practice, 
because scientists are only language users 
in lab coats.41,42
The representation of  
tractable scientific knowledge
For a concrete illustration of issues raised 
by the scientific-database view of the SW, 
we can consider the questions of mean-
ing and interpretation of formal knowledge 
that Toni Kazic first asked in connection 
with biological databases. These questions 
could be expected to form part of any SW 
wide enough to cover scientific and techni-
cal knowledge. Kazic has raised a number 
of issues close in spirit to those of this ar-
ticle,43 but against a background of expert 
knowledge of biology that would be hard to 
capture here.
In brief, she draws attention to two sym-
metric chemical reactions of cleavage (a 
molecule splitting into simpler molecules), 
which we can write as A <-> B and C <-> D. 
An enzyme Z catalyzes both these reactions, 
according to KEGG (Kyoto Encyclopedia of 
Genes and Genomes, www.genome.jp/kegg/
kegg1.html) maps, the standard knowledge 
structures in the field. However, catalyzing 
these two reactions is normally the prov-
ince of Y compounds. Z isn’t in class Y, so it 
shouldn’t, in standard theory, be able to cata-
lyze the reactions. Yet it does. A comment in 
the KEGG maps states that Z can catalyze 
reactions such as those of another enzyme 
Z' under some circumstances, where Z' ac-
tually is a Y, although its reactions differ 
considerably from Z. In addition, Z and Z' 
can’t be substituted for each other, and nei-
ther can be rewritten as the other. Moreover, 
Z has apparently contradictory properties, 
being both a statin (which stops growth) and 
a growth factor. Kazic asks, “so how can the 
same enzyme stimulate the growth of one 
cell and inhibit the growth of another?” 43
This is an inadequate attempt to state 
the biological facts in this nonspecialist 
form, but it’s clear that something odd is 
going on here, something that Marxists 
might once have hailed as a dialectical or 
contradictory relationship. It’s certainly 
an abstract structure that challenges con-
ventional KRs. It’s also far more complex 
than the standard form of default reason-
ing in AI, which takes the view that if any-
thing is an elephant, it has four legs, even 
though Clyde, undoubtedly an elephant, 
has only three.
The flavor of the phenomena here is 
that of extreme context dependence—that 
is to say, an entity behaves quite differ-
ently—indeed in opposite fashions—in 
the presence of certain other entities. Lan-
guages are, of course, full of such phe-
nomena, such as when “cleave to the Lord” 
and “cleave a log” mean exactly opposite 
things. We have structures in language 
representation for describing and repre-
senting such phenomena, although there’s 
no reason at the moment to believe they’re 
of any assistance here.
Kazic is making the point that any SW 
that represents biological information (and 
licenses correct inferences) must be able to 
deal with phenomena as complex as this. At 
first sight, such phenomena seem beyond 
the ability of a standard ontology dependent 
on context-free relations of inclusion and 
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the other standard relations, as Kazic puts 
this matter:
To ensure the scientific validity of the Se-
mantic Web’s computations, it must suffi-
ciently capture and use the semantics of the 
domain’s data and computations.43
In connection with the initial translation 
into RDF, she continues,
Building a tree of phrases to emulate bind-
ing … forces one to say explicitly something 
one may not know (for example, whether 
the binding is random or sequential, what 
the order of any sequential binding is …). 
By expanding the detail to accommodate the 
phrasal structure, essential and useful ambi-
guities have been lost.43
This quotation is revealing about the struc-
ture of science and the degree to which it re-
mains partly a craft skill, even in the most 
technical modern areas. Even if that weren’t 
the case, being forced to be more explicit 
and to remove ambiguities could have only 
a positive influence. The quotation brings 
out the dilemma in some parts of advanced 
science that intend to use the SW: whether 
the science is yet explicit enough and well 
understood enough to be formally coded. 
This question is quite separate from issues 
of whether the proposed codings (from RDF 
to DAML+OIL) have the representational 
power to express what’s to be made explicit.
If biology isn’t yet explicit and well-
enough understood, then it might not be so 
different from ordinary life as we might have 
thought. It’s certainly not so different from 
the language of auction house catalogs, as in 
Spärck Jones’ example. In that example, the 
semantics remains implicit, in that it rests on 
our human interpretation of the words of an-
notations or comments (or, in Kazic’s case, 
in the margins of KEGG maps).
The analogy here isn’t precise, of course: 
current SW representational styles have, to 
some degree, sacrificed representational 
sophistication to computational tractabil-
ity (as, in a different way, the Web itself did 
in the early ’90s). Perhaps, when some of 
the greater representational powers in tra-
ditional Gofai research are brought to bear, 
the KEGG-style comments might be trans-
lated from English phrases with an implicit 
semantics to the explicit semantics of on-
tologies and rules. This is what we must all 
hope for. But in the case of Spärck Jones’ 
description of the 17th-century cup, the 
problem doesn’t lie in any KR. It lies only 
in the fact that the terms involved are all 
so precise and specific that no generaliza-
tions—no imaginable auction ontology—
would provide a coding that lets us throw 
away the original English. The possibility 
always remains of translation into another 
language or an explicit numbering of all the 
concepts in the passage, but neither route 
provides any representational savings.44
Kazic goes on to argue that one effect of 
these difficulties about explicitness is that 
“most of the semantics are pushed onto the 
applications,”43 where the Web agents might 
or might not work, but there’s insufficient 
explicitness to know why in either case. 
This is a traditional problem. For example, 
a major AI objection to the connectionist/
neural net movement was that, whether the 
approach worked or not, nothing was served 
scientifically if what it did wasn’t under-
stood—that is, transparent and explicit. We 
don’t yet have enough SW data to be sure, 
but it’s completely against the spirit of the 
SW that its operations should be unneces-
sarily opaque or covert. This becomes even 
clearer if you see the SW as the Web plus 
the meanings, where you would expect only 
additional, not less explicit, information.
Discussions in this area normally avoid 
more traditional ontological inquiries—
namely, what things there are in the world. 
Ancient questions have a habit of returning 
to bite you at the end, though. In this article, 
I’ve taken a robust position, in the spirit of 
Willard Quine,45 that whatever we put into 
our representations—concepts, sets, and 
so on—has existence, at least as a polite 
convention. But a fully explicit SW might 
have to make ontological commitments of 
a more traditional sort, at least regarding 
the URIs—the points where the SW meets 
the world of unique descriptions of real 
things. But scientific examples of this inter-
face in the world of genes are by no means 
straightforward.
Suppose we ask, what are the ontologi-
cal objects in genetics—say, in the classic 
Drosophila database FlyBase?46 FlyBase 
ultimately grounds its gene identifiers—
the formal gene names—in the sequenced 
Drosophila genome and associates nucleo-
tide sequences parsed into introns, exons, 
regulatory regions, and so on with gene 
IDs. However, these sequences often need 
modifying because of new discoveries in 
the literature. For example, as scientists 
understand better how genes get expressed 
in various biological processes, they fre-
quently identify new regulatory regions 
upstream from the gene sequence. So, the 
gene ID’s “referent” changes, and with it 
information about the role of the “gene.” 
However, for most biologists, the gene is 
still the organizing concept around which 
knowledge is clustered. So, they will con-
tinue to say quite happily that the gene “ru-
tabaga” does such-and-such, even if they’re 
aware that rutabaga’s referent has changed 
significantly several times over the last de-
cade. The curators and biologists are, for 
the most part, content with this situation, 
although some in the Drosophila commu-
nity have argued that the community over-
all has been cavalier with gene naming.
This situation, assuming my nonexpert 
description is broadly correct, shows that 
ontological issues still exist in the original 
sense of that word: that is, as to what there 
actually is in the world. More precisely, it 
directly refutes Putnam’s optimistic theory 
that meaning can ultimately be grounded 
in science because only scientists know the 
true criteria for selecting the referents of 
terms.40 The Drosophila case shows this 
isn’t so. In some cases geneticists have only 
a hunch, sometimes proved false in prac-
tice, that there are lower-level objects un-
ambiguously corresponding to a gene ID, in 
the way an elementary molecular structure 
certainly corresponds to an element’s name 
in Mendeleev’s table (and in the way SW 
URIs correspond to unique data objects).
There’s also a fourth view of the SW, one much harder to define and dis-
cuss: If the SW just keeps moving as an en-
gineering development and is lucky (as the 
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successful scale-up of the Web seems to have 
been luckier, or better designed, than many 
cynics expected), then real problems won’t 
arise. This view is a hunch and not open to 
close analysis, but I can only wish it well, 
without being able to discuss it in detail here. 
The situation remains that the SW hasn’t yet 
taken off as the Web, Google IR, and iPods 
did. Maybe something about the SW’s se-
mantics is holding it back—something per-
haps connected, as I’ve argued, to its failure 
so far to generate semiformalized material 
on a great scale from existing Web material, 
though this could change at any moment.
NLP will continue to underlie the SW, 
including its initial construction from un-
structured sources such as the Web, whether 
its advocates realize this or not. Such NLP 
activity is the only way up to a defensible 
notion of meaning at conceptual levels (in 
the original SW diagram) based on lower-
level empirical computations of usage. I’m 
definitely not trying to claim logic-bad, 
NLP-good in any simple-minded way, but 
that the SW will be a fascinating interac-
tion of these two methodologies, again 
like the Web (which has been basically a 
field for statistical NLP research) but with 
deeper content.
Only NLP technologies (and chiefly IE) 
will be able to provide the requisite RDF 
knowledge stores for the SW from existing 
Web (unstructured) text databases, and in 
the vast quantities needed. There is no al-
ternative at this point. A wholly or mostly 
handcrafted SW is also unthinkable, as is 
a SW built from scratch and without refer-
ence to the Web. I also assume that, what-
ever the limitations on current SW repre-
sentational power, the SW will continue to 
grow in a distributed manner so as to serve 
scientists’ needs, even if it isn’t perfect. The 
Web has already shown how an imperfect 
artifact can become indispensable.
Contemporary statistical large-scale NLP 
offers new ways of looking at usage in de-
tail and in quantity, even if we can’t easily 
relate the huge quantities required to an un-
derlying theory of human learning and un-
derstanding. We can see glimmerings, in 
machine learning studies, of something like 
Wittgenstein’s “language games”2 in action 
and of the role of key concepts in the repre-
sentation of a whole language. Part of this 
can be done only by some automated reca-
pitulation of primitive concepts’ role in the 
organization of (human-built) ontologies, 
thesauri, and wordnets.
The heart of the issue is the creation of 
meaning by some interaction of (unstruc-
tured language) usage and the interpreta-
tions to be given to higher-level concepts. 
This is a general issue, but the construc-
tion of the SW faces it crucially. This is-
sue could be the critical arena for prog-
ress on a problem that goes back at least 
to Immanuel Kant’s classic formulation 
in terms of “concepts without percepts 
are empty, percepts without concepts are 
blind.” If we see that opposition as one of 
language data (such as percepts) to con-
cepts, the risk is of formally defined con-
cepts always remaining empty (see Ian 
Horrocks and Peter Patel-Schneider’s dis-
cussions of SW meaning47). The answer 
is, of course, to find a way upward from 
one to the other.
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